



RECIPROCAL SERVITUDES OR EASEMENTS.
The question whether'when a servitude is acquired by prescrip-
tion in favor of land, as a charge upon other land, a reciprocal
right is acquired in favor of the servient tenement to a continued
exercise of the servitude, has been often discussed in courts of law,
but seems never to have been finally decided.
That the dominant tenement may be charged by express grant
with the reciprocal servitude as the consideration of the servitude
imposed on the. servient tenement-the land and not, the person
being subjected to the charge-seems to be very Wlar. -
If a person covenants that in consideration that he is permitted
to flow his neighbor's land with water, he will for ever maintain the
dam on his own land by which the overflow is effected, so as to
form an icefield; he not only charges himself personally with the
obligation, but a reciprocal servitude is constituted which charges
the dominant tenement and may pass as appurtenant to it. Is
such a reciprocal servitude implied from the exercise of the prin-
cipal right during the time of limitation ?
The foundation* of a prescriptive servitude is adverse possession;
but adverse possession does not always imply a wrongful com-
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mencement. A possession which commences under a license if
enjoyed as of right, is adverse.
When two proprietors build houses each on his own land, but
under the same common roof, and with a common support, each
has a servitude of support against the other. The reciprocal ser-
vitude in this case depends upon a mutual license ; but the posses-
sion is of right and adverse. The mutual advantage is the consi-
deration of the express and implied license. As soon as the
license is executed, the right to the servitude of support exists; a
fortiori is the right absolute after an enjoyment during the time
of limitation. In the case supposed, the advantage is mutual and
immediate, and the reciprocal servitudes are the consideration each
of the other ; but a case may be stated where there is no such im-
mediate advantage to the servient tenement, and yet a reciprocal
servitude clearly exists. If A. builds the wall of his house partly
on his own land and partly on the land of B., the latter would,
after twenty years, acquire a right to have the wall maintained as
a support for a house to be subsequently erected.
The foundation of a reciprocal servitude is a presumed grant, and
in general an adverse possession is the necessary basis of such a
grant. If a proprietor erects a dam on a stream upon his own land,
and thus sets the water back upon the land of a proprietor above,
he furnishes him with a right of action, and by an adverse user for
twenty years, acquires a right to maintain the dam; but what is
the foundation on which the right of the upper proprietor to have
the overflow which has existed by means of the dam continued for
his benefit ? His enjoyment of the water for twenty years has
never given any cause of action to the proprietor of the dam. His
user may have been as of right, but it has not been adverse in the
sense that an action might have been sustained against him. Ad-
mitting that the advantages derived from the flow of water may
have been the reason for the acquiescence of the owner of the
servient land in the charge upon his land, it may be asked, what
right has he acquired to have it continued? Although a wrongful
adverse possession is generally the foundation of a presumed
grant, it is not its only support.
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A mutual advantage may be the consideration for an agreement
to impose reciprocal charges. A man may be presumed to have
granted the servitude imittendi tigni, in consideration of the sup-
port which the timber yields to the servient tenement. When a
party-wall is erected so as to stand upon the land of two adjoining
proprietors, there is a presumed agreement on the part of each
proprietor to maintain that portion of the wall standing on his own
land. The presumption results from the mutuality of the consi-
deration. So if a man erects a dam and a tide mill, partly on his
own land and partly on the land of his neighbor, who uses the
water for propelling machinery, the acquiescence of the owner of
the servient land in the use thus made of his premises, may be a
consideration for a charge upon the owner of the dominant tene-
nient, to submit to the maintenance of the dam in part upon his
own land.It would seem that the agreement in such a case is to be pre-
sumed as a fact, and is not a conclusion of law such as results
from an adverse enjoyment which gives a cause of action. When
an adjoining proprietor derives an advantage which corresponds
with that of the encroaching party, from the acts which trenqh
upon his property, a strong presumption exists that such advan-
tage was the inducement for his acquiescence, and that there was
an agreement for mutual servitudes ; but the presumption in such
cases is not absolute,-like the presumption of law which exists
where a cause of action exists on an adverse possession. The pre-
sutfiption is one of fact only within the discretion of the triers.
If a man builds a house so that the water falls from the'eaves upon
his neighbor's land, he may acquire an absolute right to the over-
hanging eaves, after an enjoyment of twenty years; but his
neighbor does not acquire an absolute right to have the house main-
tained for the purpose of supplying water from the roof. If the
owner of the servient tenement derives some advantage from the
flow of water from the eaves, it is so disproportioned to the burden
which would be imposed by the constitution of reciprocal servi..
tudes, that as a presumption of fact it would be absurd to suppose
their existence.
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It appears, from the following passage in the Digest of Justinian,
that when a work has existed on land of a proprietor, from which
a neighbor's land derived advantage, a servitude resulted from long
enjoyment, in favor of the land benefited by the work : D. 39, 3,
2. 5. c Item Yarus ait, Aggerem, qui in fundo vicini erat, vis
aquoe dejecit: per quod effectum est, ut aqua pluvia mihi noceret.
Varus nit, Si naturalis agger fuit non posse me vicinum cogere
aqute pluvime arcendze actione, ut eum reponat vel reponi sinat.
Idemque putat, et si manufactus fuit, neque memoria ejus exstaret:
quod si exstet, putat aqum pluvie arcendm actione eum teneri.
Labeo autem, si manufactus sit agger, etiamsi memoria ejus non
exstat, agi posse, ut reponatur: nam hae actione neminem cogi
posse, ut vicino prosit, sed ne noceat aut interpellet facientem quod
jure facere possit. Quamquam tamen deficiat aquv pluvio arcendoe
actio: attamen opinor utilem actionem vel interdictum mihi com-
petere adversus vicinum, si velim aggerem restituere in agro ejus,
qui factus mihi quidem prodesse potest, ipsi vero nihil nociturus
est; htec mquitas suggerit, etsi jure deficiamur." (Varu's sup-
poses that an embankment on the land of a neighbor has been
carried away by a flood, in consequence of which I sustain damage
from the discharge of rain water. Yarus says that if the embank-
ment was a natural one, I cannot, by the action aquce pluvie
arcendce, compel my neighbor to restore it, or suffer it to be restored,
and he thinks that the same is true if the embankment is artificial,
if the fact that it is so cannot be shown: but if it can be shown
to be artificial, the action aquce pluice arcendce may be sustained
against him. But Labeo is of opinion that if the embankment is
artificial, though (having existed immemorially) no evidence of the
fact exists, the action for its restoration may be sustained. For
by this action one cannot be constrained to do something for the
profit of his neighbor, but to avoid doing him an injury, or pre-
venting what he may lawfully perform. But, even if he is not
entitled to the action, stili I am of opinion, says Paul, that the
actio utilis is competent against a neighbor, or an interdict, if I
desire to restore the embankment on his land, which, -when restored,
will benefit me, and not be injurious to him. This equity suggests,
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even if the legal remedy fails.) It appears that if in this case the
embankment had been a natural one, the action could not have
been sustained, because it is evident the right to have the embank-
ment maintained depended upon the existence of a servitude
created by grant or prescription. The circumstance that it could
not be shown when the right commenced, Labeo supposes was not
material, if the work was really an artificial one. It does not
seem to have been at all material, whether the embankment was
constructed by the owner of the land where it existed, or by the
owner of the land protected by it. A right to the mound as a ser-
vitude existed, if the work was an artificial one, because created
under a grant express or presumed. If the protection had depended
upon a natural bank, no agreement could have been implied, and
the rights of'the parties would have been different.
It is evident, from the case supposed, that the artificial work
was an ancient one, and that the rights of the parties depended
not upon an express grant, but upon a grant to be presumed from
long user. Some agreement, from the mere enjoyment of the pro-
tection which the embankment gave, was presumed. The enjoy-
ment of the servitude was of right, but not adverse, in thb sense
that a cause of action was given to the proprietor from whose land
it was due. Now, if we suppose that in this case the effect of
the embankment was to turn the course of a stream from the land
of the party claiming the servitude, for the benefit of the owner
of the land on which it was made, reciprocal servitudes would have
been created, and the doctrine of the case supposed would have
been consistent with the principle that a grant may be presumed,
in certain cases, from the mere enjoyment of rights; from their
continued exercise, without giving a right of action. But if we
suppose the owner of the land to have derived no advantage froml
the embankment on his land, but that he has assumed the onerous
duty of protecting the adjoining land from floods, the case stated
is stronger. An agreement for a sufficient (pecuniary) considera-
tion .is presumed merely from the long-continued enjoyment of the
protection in favor of the party claiming the right. The grant
is then presumed from the long submission of the proprietor to a
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burdensome charge. The servitude in that case is not reciprocal,
but the benefit is all on one side. When a mutual advantage is
derived from the exercise of a servitude, a consideration for the
agreement presumed in the case is shown. If' aservitude may be
presumed, from the protection of adjoining land from an overflow,
against the owner of land who erects a work for his own advantage,
without trenching upon his neighbor's land; the presumption in its
favor is much stronger when the maintenance of the work imposes
a continued charge upon land to which this same charge yields an
advantage. The obligation is then reciprocal, and one servitude
is a consideration for the other. A qualified right is gained by
the party who exercises such a servitude during the time of pre-
scription. A person who, by the erection of an embankment on
his own land, diverts the course of a stream from its natural bed,
during the time of prescription, acquires the right indeed to the
stream in its new course, but he acquires the right subject to the
duty of maintaining the embankment. The proprietor who acquires
the right to the stream in its new course, imposes by the same act
the duty of receiving the flow of the water upon his own land.
He is not justified in destroying the work, and if it has been carried
away by a flood, the owner of the land in favor of which the
right exists may enter and reconstruct it.
It appears, from a passage in the Digest,' and the Commentary
of J. Voet, that when the effect of a building on the land of one
person has been to introduce a favorable light by reverberation
into the apartments of a neighboring house, the duty of maintain-
ing such hbuse may become a charge upon its proprietor for the
advantage of his neighbor. The duty of maintaining the structure
is imposed upon the owner of the house for the benefit of his neigh-
bofs, and then, says Voet, as in the case of the- servitude oneris
ferendi, he is compelled to perform an act upon his own land con-
trary to the ordinary nature of a servitude. After explaining
in what sense the servitude. license alteris tollere is to be under-
I Interdum dici potest, eum quoque, qui tollit &,dificium, vel deprimit, luminibus
officere: si forte xara dvrav,6aatr, id est, per refraclioenem, seu repercu 8oinemr, e]
pressura quadam lumen in eas Eedes devolvatur. D. 8, 2, 17, 2.
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stood, he says that, besides that, there is another servitude by
which a person is compelled upon his own premises to maintain a
structure at a certain height, whether this is done for the light,
or for the sake of a grateful shade to his neighbor, or to turn
away the wind and cold from his premises. It is evident that
Ulpian, in the passage cited from the Digest, had in view a case
where the right was claimed, not, in virtue of an express grant,
but as resulting from long-continued enjoyment. In this instance,
the prescriptive right was not founded upon an adverse user. The
party who had acquired against his neighbor the servitude which
required him to perform something on his own 'land, not merely
to submit to the performance of acts, had enjoyed the privilege
claimed under circumstances which raised indeed the presumption
of a right, but in the legitimate exercise of his own right of pro-
perty, and therefore not adversely.
In a case decided by the Supreme Court of Vermont (1 Wil-
liams' Reports 265), it was held that if the owner'of land through
which a stream runs changes the course of the stream on his own
land, to the prejudice of other proprietors above or below, he acquires
the right to continue the stream in the new channel after the time
of limitation. But if the diversion affects other proprietors favor-
ably, and the party oi whose land the diversion is made acquiesced
in the stream running in the new channel, for so long.a time, that
new rights may be presumed to have accrued, or have in fact
accrued, in faith of the new state of the stream, the party is bound
by such acquiescence, and cannot return the stream to its former
channel. This case is, in principle, perfectly analogous to that
of the embankment cited above from the Digest; the party, by
embankment or other means on his own land, has prevented the
land of an adjoining proprietor from being overflowed, and the
right to have the diversion continued by such means is a servitude.
After the time of limitation, the proprietor Who has diverted the
stream acquires the right to its continued flow in the new channel,
and a right has been gained at the same time by the owner of the
land where it flowed before, to be protected by means of the
embankment by. which the stream was diverted. Here is an in-
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stance of reciprocal servitudes which rest upon the footing of a
mutual agreement, and an agreement which is presumed on one
side without an adverse possession. The proprietor from whose
land the stream was diverted, acquired a right to have the em-
bankment maintained without any adverse user by which a cause
of action was furnished to the proprietor of the tenement oil which
the servitude was. An agreement was prdsumed on other grounds
than an adverse possession. The Court were of opinion that the
principle which governed the case was analogous to the rules of
law which have been applied to dedications of land to public use.
Ordinarily, when land is dedicated to public uses, there is an ad-
verse user; but cases of dedication are decided upon the ground
of a presumed agreement, which takes effect at the time of the
supposed dedication, and does not depend for its efficacy upon
the lapse of time. The principle on which reciprocal servitudes
rest has, however, a greater analogy to the rules established for
executed licenses. The gain on one side corresponds with the
gain and the consequent obligations on the other. As in the
instance of an executed license, the party who has diverted a
stream has authorized another to act upon the assumption of a new
state of rights. When the proprietor of land diverts the course
of a stream from his neighbor's land, he does not acquire a right
to the continued flow of the water, until after the time of limita-
tion has passed; but the reciprocal servitude which the neighbor-
ing proprietor gains may, at his election, take effect immediately.
If the embankment by which the course of the stream is changed
is destroyed by a flood, soon after the change of the condition of
the property, he may require it to be restored, or that he shall be
permitted to restore, if he has acted upon the changed condition
of things, by building or otherwise. There is an agreement on
the part of the owner who makes the diversion, to permit the
stream to flow in its new course. As in other cases of licehse, the
agreement may be shown by parol, and it is implied from the act
of the party himself. It is no objection, therefore, that the enjoy,
ment is not adverse. It is adverse in the sense that it is of right.
It is not on the footing of a wrongful possession that the right is
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acquired, but on an agreement inferred from the acts of the parties,
as in cases of license and dedication, and which binds them upon
equitable considerations. The question whether a reciprocal ser-
vitude may be implied in favor of land subjected to a servitude,
has arisen in the English Courts, and is placed upon the true
ground, in a case decided by the Court of Exchequer: Greatrex
vs. Rcayward, 8 Excheq. Rep. 292. -- The right of the party,"
said PAUKE, B., "to an artificial watercourse, as against the party
creating it, must depend upon the character of the watercourse,
and the circumstances under which it was created." In that case,
the plaintiff, who had received the flow of water from a drain
made artificially for agricultural purposes, for more than twenty
years, from the land of the defendant, who was an adjoining pro-
prietor, brought an action against the latter for diverting the water
by alterations made in the drainage of hisclose. - The, Court held
that the watercourse was of a temporary nature only, and depend-
ent upon the mode which the defendant might 'adopt in draining
his land. In truth, the right claimed in this case was not the
proper subject-matter of a servitude. It depended upon the course!
of cultivation and upon the acts of men, and was not capable, like
a natural stream of water, of constituting a perpetual servitude.
It was, in this respect, not more permanent in its character than
the case supposed by ALDERSON, B., of a farmer who, under the
old system of farming, has allowed the liquid manure from his fold.
yard to run into a pit in his neighbor's field, but, upon finding that,
the manure can be beneficially applied to his own land, has stopped
the flow of it into his neighbor's pit, and converted it to his own
use; it could not be contended that the fact of his neighbor having
used this manure for upwards of twenty years would give the latter
the right of requiring its continuance. If, in this case, the ques-
tion had related to the right of an adjoining proprietor to the
continued flow of a stream which had been diverted from its natural
course, after twenty years' enjoyment, it would have been held to be
absolute; and yet, even in that case, though the flow of the water
would have been enjoyed as of right, there would have been no
adverse user. The right in such a case would depend upon license,
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for, in availing himself of the user of the watercourse, the party,
instead of subjecting himself to an action, would have done so by
the consent of the owner from whose premises it was received.
In an earlier case in the same Court, it was held that no action
lay for an injury by the diversion of an artificial watercourse,
where, from the nature of the case, it was obvious that the en-
joyment of it depended upon temporary circumstances, and was
not of a permanent character, and when the interruption was by
the party who stood in the situation of the grantor: Arkwright vs.
Gill, 5 M. & W. 231.
In another case (Wood vs. Waud, 3 Excheq. Rep. 748) it was
held that the right to artificial watercourses, as against the party
creating them, must depend upon the character of the watercourse,
whether it be of a permanent or temporary nature, and upon the
circumstances under which it is created ; and the enjoyment for
twenty years of a stream diverted or penned up by permanent
embankment, stands upon a different footing from the enjoyment
of a flow of water originating in the mode of occupation or altera-
tion of a person's property, and presumably of a temporary
character, and liable to alteration. The flow of water for twenty
years, it was said, from the eaves of a house, could not give a right
to the neighbor to insist that the house should not be pulled down
or altered, so as to diminish the quantity of water flowing from
the roof. The flow of water from a drain, for the purposes of
agricultural improvements, for twenty years, could not give a right
to the neighbor so asto preclude the proprietor from altering the level
of his drains for the greater improvement of the land. The state
of circumstances, in such cases, shows that one party never intended
to give, nor the other to enjoy, the use of the stream, as a'matter
of right.
But the ground upon which the Court of Exchequer proceeded,
assumed that a reciprocal servitude might be acquired in an unfail-
ing watercourse, when the party from whose land it was discharged
had, by such a discharge, gained the right to have the water flow
in that manner. There is nothing, except an observation from
ALDE.RSON, 13., in Greatrex vs. Hayward, from which it can be
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inferred that the circumstance that the enjoyment of the party
claiming the reciprocal servitude is not adverse, in the sense that
it furnished a right of action, would, in the opinion of the Court,
prevent him from acquiring the servitude by an uninterrupted
enjoyment for twenty years ; but the character of the right claimed
in the above cases, its temporary and uncertain value, is in each
case put forward as distinguishing it from a case where, from the
lasting Character of the right, the reciprocal charge seems to be
conceded to be equally permanent. And in another case decided
by the Court of Queen's Bench (Mragor vs. Chadwick, 11 Ad.
& El. 571), it was held where mine owners made an adit through
their lands to drain the mine, which they afterwards ceased to
work, and the owner of a brewery through whose, premises the
wter flowed for twenty years after the working had ceased, had,
during that time, used it for brewing, that he thereby gained
a right to the undisturbed enjoyment of the water, and that the
mines could not afterwards be so worked as to pollute it. In
this case the watercourse, though created artificially, had a per-
petual source, and was therefore the proper subject of a servi-
tude; and the doctrine of the case was, in effect, that whilst, by
the flow of the stream, the owners of the mine were gaining the
right to discharge the water upon the land of a neighbor, he'was,
at the same time, acquiring a right to have the flow of the water
continued in its artificial bed. The decision seems to have been
regarded as questionable, but merely upon the ground that the
watercourse was an artificial one, and established for a temporary
purpose ; but it has never been doubted that the rule established
in this case would have been properly applicable to a case where
the cause of the servitude was perpetual. It is observable of this
case, that although it was held that the owner of the servient tene-
ment acquired a reciprocal servitude by his enjoyment of the water
which was a charge upon the dominant land, there was no adverse
enjoyment in the sense that he furnished a cause of action to the
proprietor of the land from which the stream took its course. He
merely exercised an incident of property in appropriating the
water discharged upon his land, and yet by such user he acquired
